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I.
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
All parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption.

Appellant

Alexander Gomez was the plaintiff below. Appellees Salt Lake Community College
District and the State of Utah were the defendants.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j).
V.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion in limine to
exclude entirely the testimony of the plaintiffs proposed expert witnesses. (R.560-2;
A.l-3)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The apphcable standard of appellate review is abusive discretion in the trial
court's decision to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs experts. State v. Larsen,
865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993).
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VI.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is determinative in this case. That
rule states:
TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of
any opinion or otherwise.

vn.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
This case involves an injury the plaintiff sustained while enrolled and

participating in a beginning basketball class at the Salt Lake Community College in
October, 1994. During the course of the class, the plaintiff attempted to do a "lay
up" at a side basket which had a clearance from the back of the back board to a
heater attached to the wall behind the basket of a distance less than two feet.
(Complaint and Jury Demand, R.2-3; Defendants' Memorandum in Support of
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Motion in Limine, R.371-373) The plaintiff alleges that the defendants negligently
failed to appropriately exercise their responsibilities to provide a safe environment
for beginning basketball players by (1) failing to provide sufficient clearance behind
the back board to prevent a player from coming into contact with the wall, (2)
placing a heating unit on the wall behind the back board at a level dangerous to
players, (3) failing to pad the area to protect players against injury, (4) exposing
players to the danger of injury by conducting the basketball class on a court with too
little clearance behind the back board, (5) failing to supervise it's employees, and (6)
otherwise failing to exercise a reasonable level of care under the circumstances. (R.
2-3)
In order to establish the defendants9 negligence and the standard of care which
should be exercised by instructors of beginning basketball courses, the plaintiff
retained certain expert witnesses and proposed to have those experts testify at trial.
The defendants successfully moved to prevent the plaintiffs proposed experts from
testifying. Although the defendants challenged the proposed experts' qualifications,
the court ruled primarily that expert testimony was not "necessary or proper11 in this
case. (Order on Defendant's Motion in Limine, R. 561; A. 1-3) The court was also
concerned with the likelihood that the jury would focus on the qualifications of
former Brigham Young University basketball coach Roger Reid, one of the plaintiffs
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proposed expert witnesses, "as opposed to focusing on whether or not the instructor
of this physical education basketball class conduct was unreasonable under the
circumstances." (P. 7 of Transcript of: Pretrial Motions, R. 596) Although the
order on the defendants' motion in limine is dated December 1,1997, the court ruled
on the morning of the first day of trial, October 22, 1997, to exclude the plaintiffs
proposed experts.
A trial was conducted on October 22-24,1997. At the conclusion of trial, the
jury found the defendant, Salt Lake Community College, not negligent and the court
entered a judgment of no cause of action. (R. 578-81)
B.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review.
In October, 1994, the plaintiff was enrolled at the South City Campus of Salt

Lake Community College. That campus is formerly South High School. The
plaintiff had enrolled in a beginning basketball course. The day of the plaintiffs
injury was the first day of class and the class was being conducted by Kenneth
Carlson, a substitute teacher. (R. 370-1)
Carlson had instructed the class to play cross-court on the side baskets in the
gymnasium in a competitive full court game. "Playing cross-court" means that the
teams are not on the standard marked basketball court but rather on side baskets
which do not have the same amount of clearance behind the back boards or out-of-
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bounds markings on the floor. The back boards for the cross court game were fixed
to the walls and only allowed a clearance of less than two feet between the back
board and the wall with an abutting heating unit. (R. 371) The baskets on the
regular court in that gym had a clearance of approximately eight feet between the
back boards and the walls. The walls behind those baskets were also padded.
(Deposition of Kenneth Dean Carlson, exhibit #2, R. 597; A. 4-5. The photographs
have also been reproduced in color.)
The plaintiff was injured when his knee impacted the heating unit immediately
behind the basket at which the plaintiff was attempting to make a lay up basketball
shot during the course of the basketball game conducted and supervised by the
substitute teacher. (R. 2-3) As a result of impacting the heating unit with his knee,
the plaintiff was required to undergo surgery and subsequent rehabilitation of his
knee.
VIIL
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The substitute teacher of the beginning basketball course failed to
appropriately exercise his responsibilities to provide a safe environment for the
beginning basketball players enrolled in that class during which the plaintiff was
injured. Physical education instructors and coaches are extensively trained in order
to fulfill the assignments of their profession. Expert testimony was necessary for the
5

jury to understand what steps instructors should take in order to provide a safe
experience for beginning basketball players and the appropriate standard of care for
instructors of beginning basketball players.
By excluding the proposed expert testimony, the trial judge completely
destroyed the plaintiffs theory of the case. The focus of the case was no longer on
whether the instructor failed to conduct the class reasonably and in a facility that
was reasonably safe. In fact, the trial court recognized that the "focus" should be
on the conduct of the instructor in teaching the class. The trial court's order was
inconsistent with that goal and actually moved the focus away from what the court
stated it should be. Because of the court's ruling, the ultimate issue for the jury was
simply whether the landowner had a duty to warn of a "open and obvious hazard".
The trial judge abused his discretion by not allowing the plaintiff to call the proposed
expert witnesses.
IX,
ARGUMENT
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows for testimony by experts if
"specialized knowledge" of the expert will "assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact at issue . . . ." Utah law is clear that the "question
that must be posed prior to the admission of any expert evidence is whether, 'on
balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact.'" State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d
6

1355, 1361 (Utah 1993); citing, State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n.8 (Utah
1989); see Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982). The Larsen court went
on to state:
In determining "helpfulness," the trial
court must first decide whether the subject is
within the knowledge of experience of the
average individual. Dixon, 658 P.2d at 597.
It is not necessary that the subject of the
testimony be so erudite or arcane that the
jurors could not possibly understand it
without the aid of expert testimony, nor is it
a requirement that the subject be beyond the
comprehension of each and every juror. See
id.
The present case is not a standard premises liability action. Without the
testimony of the proposed plaintiffs experts, the case became exactly that. The
focus of the trial should have been the conduct of the instructor of "this physical
education basketball class . . . under the circumstances." (P.7 of Transcript of:
Pretrial Motions, R.596) This is not the type of a case where the landowner simply
has to warn the invitees upon his property of open and obvious hazards. The
present case is an action where the defendants are given the responsibility to provide
a safe environment in which to provide physical education instruction to beginning
basketball players. Expert testimony was necessary for the jury to understand what
the standard of care is for a school to carry out that obligation for its students.
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In order to teach at the collegiate level, instructors must obtain a certain level
of knowledge and experience.

Teachers must be certified to have classroom

education and on the job training through student teaching. That knowledge and
experience appropriately set the standard of care for the conduct to be followed in
a classroom, or in this case, gymnasium, setting. The trial court was in error by
finding that the testimony of experienced basketball instructors would not "assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." By
removing the possibility of the plaintiff presenting expert testimony that the
instructor of the plaintiffs class unreasonably placed the beginning basketball
players at risk destroyed the plaintiffs cause of action against the instructor. The
only cause of action that remained was against the defendants as a landowner. The
trial court's decision greatly prejudiced the plaintiffs claims. It was an abusive
discretion.
One of the plaintiffs proposed expert witnesses was former BYU basketball
coach Roger Reid. Mr. Reid is exceptionally qualified as an expert in how a
basketball player should be safely instructed on how to play the game. The fact that
Mr. Reid has knowledge and experience far exceeding that of the instructor who
allowed the plaintiff to participate in the beginning basketball course in an unsafe
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environment appeared to be particularly troubling for the trial court. The court
stated on page 7 of the transcript of pretrial motions:
Furthermore, in this court's view
allowing those witnesses to testify, it is more
likely in this court's opinion anyway, to
confuse the jury and to confuse the issues in
this particular case. In all likelihood to
confuse the jury in focusing, for example, on
the qualifications that Mr. [Reid] possesses in
coaching college basketball, as opposed to
focusing on whether or not the instructor of
this physical education basketball class
conduct was unreasonable under the
circumstances.
The plaintiff should not be punished for having retained one of the most
qualified witnesses in the state to testify on the pertinent issues involved in the
plaintiffs cau^e of action. The trial court abused it's discretion by excluding Mr.
Reid as an expert partially because Mr. Reid has exceptional qualifications which go
beyond the instructing of physical education courses at the collegiate level.
At trial, the testimony of Mr. Carlson, the substitute teacher, and that of the
teacher assigned to instruct the course on the day the plaintiff was injured was, of
course, material, relevant and proper testimony. The effect of that testimony,
however, was to allow the defense to have expert testimony presented to the jury
without the plaintiff having the opportunity to present rebuttal testimony. The jury
was presented only with the opinions of the defendants themselves that their conduct
9

was reasonable. The court's ruling to exclude the plaintiffs proposed expert witness
tilted the playing field decidedly in favor of the defendants.
The plaintiff has not found a case in Utah involving the standard of care for
instruction at the collegiate level. Although such instruction may not be scientific or
technical, it does require specialized knowledge. The Larsen court, made clear that
the subject matter for cases requiring expert testimony does not have to be such that
no juror would "possibly understand it without the aid of expert testimony . . . ."
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. The defendants maintain that all jurors are familiar with
running, jumping and avoiding hazards. That understanding is only part of the
picture presented by this case. The average juror, however, is not familiar with how
organized basketball instruction should be safely performed. In order to assist the
jury in understanding that appropriate standard of care, expert testimony was
necessary.

10

X.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the testimony of the plaintiffs proposed experts would have
clearly assisted the jury in its deliberations, allowed the plaintiff to appropriately
present his theory of the case and given the plaintiff a level playing field. The
plaintiff submits that the district court abused it's discretion in excluding the
plaintiffs proposed expert testimony. The plaintiff requests that this case be
remanded so that a new trial can be conducted where appropriate expert testimony
can be presented to the jury.
DATED this

%

day of July, 1998.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

By:_
MARK DALTON DUNN
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RAYMOND A. HINTZE (1501)
J. WESLEY ROBINSON (6321)
Assistant Attorneys General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
P.O. Box 140856
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0124
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ALEXANDER GOMEZ
Plaintiff,

:
:
:

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION IN LIMINE

v.

:

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT, THE
STATE OF UTAH

:
:
:

Case No. 960903291

:

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendant.

Defendant Salt Lake Community College's Motion in Limine was
considered by the Court on memoranda submitted by counsel on
October 22, 1997.

The Court, having read the memoranda and being

fully advised of the premises, makes the following Order:
It is-hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant Salt
Lake Community College's Motion in Limine to exclude proposed
expert witnesses Dee Oldroyd and Roger Reid be and is hereby

1

granted.
The Court finds that the standard of care to be applied in
this case is the reasonable man standard and that no technical or
other specialized knowledge is necessary or proper to present to
the jury on the issue of negligence. The subject of inquiry is not
beyond the knowledge generally possessed by laymen and the expert
testimony offered by Plaintiff is improper expert testimony.

DATED th i .

/

day of

6

, 1997,

JUDGED TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Third Judicial District

Approved—as tp--f«rm

UJ

Mark D. Dunn
DEBRY & ASSOCIATES

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER U2J DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE, postage prepaid,
this

3yft*

day of

TUvwv&'y

, 1997, to the following:

MARK D DUNN
ROBERT J DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
3 5 7 5 SOUTH MARKET STREET
SUITE 2 0 6
WEST VALLEY CITY
UT
84119
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of July, 1998, I caused to be

mailed, I .S. mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE to the following:
Nancy L. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 140856
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856

wrl023.brf

13

